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Abstract While globally successful Japanese industries were able to use their domestic
market as a springboard into international markets, Japan’s telecommunications sector
became decoupled from global markets, trapping Japanese ICT firms in the domestic
market. This persistent pattern of leading without followers was not simply the result of
misguided technological choices, ill-informed corporate strategies, or insular government
standard-setting processes. Rather, the dynamics of competition, shaped and reshaped by
political dynamics and regulatory structures, decoupled it from global markets. These
dynamics created a “Galapagos effect”, in which winning in an isolated domestic market
led to losing in global markets. Major regulatory shifts transformed the dynamics of
competition since the late 1990s, decreasing the isolation of Japan’s telecommunications
sector, but some factors pulling it along a proprietary trajectory persist. This paper
highlights the dilemma of how to develop beyond a follower status, but avoid becoming a
leader without followers.
Keywords telecommunications . ICT . Japan . information technology . political economy
JEL Classification L93 . L86 . F50
1 Introduction
Japan’s Information Communications Technology (ICT) sector presents an intriguing
puzzle, yielding lessons applicable elsewhere. Over the past 30 to 40 years, Japanese firms
in industries such as automobiles, consumer electronics, precision equipment, semi-
conductors, and various high tech components have been successful in international
markets. Indeed, despite the country’s economic malaise from the 1990s, many Japanese
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firms continue to be world leaders in various product areas: hybrid automobiles, machine
tools, and various high-tech components, to name a few.1
In the telecommunications-related portion of the ICT sector, Japanese firms were also
leaders in many technologies, products, and markets, but with a critical difference from the
sectors above. Japan’s telecommunications-related end-products, services, and content firms
led the domestic sector towards ever-high levels of sophistication, but the highly developed
domestic sector did not lead to prominence in global markets. Time and time again, despite
Japanese ICT firms becoming leaders along a particular technological trajectory, global
markets shifted in a different direction rather than following Japan’s lead. Japanese firms,
too far along the previous trajectory, then failed to become major players along the new
trajectory. They became caught in a pattern of leading without followers.
This pattern repeated itself across a wide range of telecommunications technologies and
markets surrounding telecommunications. In the early 1990s, Japanese firms were on the
cutting edge of a set of networking technologies, ATM (Asynchronous Transfer Mode).
However, ATM was rendered largely irrelevant with the advent of the Internet, which is
based on TCP/IP protocols.
Japan also led the world in deploying a specialized high-speed (at the time)
communications network called ISDN (Integrated Services Digital Network). This costly
ISDN infrastructure was suddenly rendered almost entirely obsolete in the late 1990s by
current broadband Internet access technologies, notably DSL (Digital Subscriber Line),
deployed over conventional telephone lines.
From the mid-1990s, Japanese firms developed highly sophisticated and advanced
mobile handsets, pioneering a myriad of new high-end features. However, Japanese
handsets were largely confined to Japan, and it was Apple’s iPhone that spearheaded a
worldwide shift towards high performance “smartphones.”
Japan also pioneered a dynamic, multi-billion dollar mobile Internet content ecosystem,
predating Apple’s iPhone platform and content ecosystem by almost a decade. Yet, the
entire ecosystem, with a new breed of Japanese entrepreneurs producing profitable and fast-
growing startup firms, was confined to Japan. The iPhone and Android platforms quickly
became the dominant global mobile Internet platforms. The list goes on.
What accounts for this persistent pattern of leading without followers in Japan’s
telecommunications markets? More broadly, what are the implications for understanding
the linkages between domestic and international markets? When do we see first mover
advantages, and what are the conditions that create first-mover disadvantages? Since these
areas in telecom are closely related to services, what can we learn about the nature of
services versus manufacturing in international competition?
This paper contends that Japan’s leading without followers pattern in telecommunica-
tions was not simply the product of misguided government choices, ill-informed corporate
strategies, or insular standard-setting processes. I argue that politics and regulatory
structures shaped a specific set of competitive dynamics, which in turn shaped the choices
of technology, standards, and corporate strategies that ended up isolating Japan’s domestic
telecommunications market from global markets despite leading in particular technologies
and markets. Government choices were constrained by political dynamics and technological
uncertainty, corporate strategies were shaped by the domestic competitive dynamics that
proved disadvantageous in global markets, and standard-setting, though initially insular,
shifted towards adopting global standards, but to no avail.
1 See Schaede’s (2011) recent study of Japan’s most profitable firms for some excellent examples.
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The competitive dynamics center on four key variables: 1) the actors and their resources;
2) the source of technological trajectories; 3) the source of business models; 4) the overall
pattern of interactions at the intra-industry and government-industry levels; and 5) the
regulatory stance toward global markets. These variables were shaped and reshaped by
politics at key critical junctures.
1.1 The argument in brief
Political choices at the inception of Japan’s telecommunications sector led to a powerful
state actor with significant R&D resources. This state actor set the technological trajectory
and shaped the business models for equipment manufacturers. The regulatory focus was on
building and operating a reliable communications networks and ensuring universal access
across geographic regions—with little attention to global markets. This seemed fine in the
early developmental phases of telecommunications worldwide.
In 1985, the state-owned monopoly Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) was
partially privatized and new competitors were introduced, but NTT was not split apart. At
the same time, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) became a bureaucracy
capable of industry policy, resulting in both NTT and MPT setting technological trajectories
and business models. The sector, largely closed to new entrants and disruptive business
models, was characterized by patterned interactions among a stable set of actors. MPT’s
policy concerns were squarely on domestic development, with little strategic consideration
for international markets. Beginning in this period, that Japan’s telecommunications sector
developed rapidly while becoming decoupled from global markets—leading without
followers.
Since the late 1990s, major policy changes have significantly reshaped the dynamics of
competition. Although NTT and its R&D resources were left largely intact, NTT and MPT
are no longer the primary setters of technological trajectories. New entrants introduced new,
disruptive technologies and business models. They destabilized the entrenched patterns of
interaction, sparking price wars between carriers, mounted new challenges to government-
industry relations, and reshaped relationships between carriers and equipment manufac-
turers. As a result, Japan’s domestic telecom sector has a broader variety of linkages to
global markets than ever before. Overall, the danger of new trajectories of leading without
followers has decreased. However, some vestiges of the previous era remain; in some areas,
mostly infrastructure, the legacy of heavy investments along proprietary trajectories remains
substantial.
1.2 A political economy approach to understanding international competition
in telecommunications
A political economy approach is particularly useful to analyze market dynamics in heavily
regulated sectors, since governments and politics strongly shape the actors and what they
compete over—the range of strategic choices available to firms.2 The salience of this
approach is even more pronounced after the financial crisis of 2007–2008, which revealed
that particular types of deregulation fueled the crisis, and during the crisis, many of the key
2 This perspective is derived from the recognition that markets inherently require sustained governmental
intervention to function. They are embedded in social norms and rules, not necessarily more so for Japan
than the US. Steven K. Vogel labels this the “market-institutional perspective.” (Polanyi 1944; Fligstein
2001; Barma and Vogel 2008).
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decisions were at the national level (Tett 2009; Sorkin 2009).3 The US government’s rescue
bailouts of AIG, several other Wall Street firms, and even General Motors was
unprecedented in scale, decisively influencing the composition of actors and dynamics of
competition in finance and automobiles.
At the level of capitalist systems of advanced industrial countries, different political
settlements around the world have created a diverse array of institutional configurations and
market dynamics (Hall and Soskice 2001; Berger and Dore 1996; Yamamura and Streeck
2003; Zysman 1983; Esping-Andersen 1990). Global competition is often shaped by the
interaction of these national market dynamics on a global stage, sometimes mediated by
international organizations. Major market disruptions and discontinuous technological
breakthroughs that spring onto this global stage are usually the result of concrete
developments within a particular national context. (Zysman 2006).
In telecommunications, domestic politics and government policies are especially
influential in shaping the actors and their resources, such as R&D capabilities and funding
structures. Most countries began with state-owned monopoly telecom carriers, and political
settlements determined the exact nature of privatization, the degree of liberalization, and
market rules, such as the terms of competitors’ access to incumbents’ infrastructure. In the
US, for example, judicial decisions split up AT&T, separating its carrier functions from its
R&D labs and equipment manufacturing operations.
Telecommunications is also a prime case where governments influence what actors
compete over–the activities to which firms channel their resources to compete–shaping
vastly different corporate strategies. Spectrum allocation rules are a powerful illustration. In
several European countries, auctions for third-generation (3G) wireless spectrum led a
bidding war, leaving telecom carriers lacking the funds to build out their networks for
several years in the aftermath of the IT bubble bursting in 2000–2001.4 In Japan, by
contrast, spectrum was allocated by the government based on its internal evaluation;
carriers spent very little to obtain wireless spectrum, but the set number of licenses available
drove consolidation in the industry. 3G networks were deployed quickly, despite major
losses by Japanese carriers in the IT bubble burst as well.
Deep governmental involvement in domestic economies, combined with the diversity of
political systems and governmental structures across countries, has resulted in a wide
variety of regulatory structures and policy choices across industries—particularly in
telecommunications. These differences directly affect the composition of firms, their
business model options, and the nature of their competition–hence, the diversity across
countries in patterns of innovation, competition, business models, and incumbent carriers’
activities.5 A political economy approach captures the politics and regulations interacting
with national and sectoral dynamics of competition, allowing us to explore the deeper
causes of market outcomes, thereby providing a valuable vantage into global competition.
3 For example, the British government refused to ignore its legal requirements hindering Barclays’ purchase
of Lehman Brothers on the eve of its bankruptcy in a last minute rescue effort involving Wall Street firms and
the Federal Reserve.
4 In global finance, until the 1980s, for example, interest rates on banks and securities were largely regulated;
firms therefore did not compete in offering competitive interest rates. In Japan until the early 1990s, business
models for highly regulated sectors such as banking and pharmaceuticals entailed allocated significant
resources towards wining and dining government officials to gain information.
5 One thrust of scholarship examines the “fit” between particular technological paradigms and types of
innovation with constellations of institutions at the sectoral or national level in various advanced industrial
countries (Kitschelt 1991, Vogel and Zysman 2002, Yamamura and Streeck 2003).
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1.3 Roadmap of this paper
This paper unfolds in three parts. Part I provides an overview of Japan leading without
followers in telecommunications by presenting the four technology and market cases. Part
II examines the historical origins and evolution of the elements underpinning Japan’s
dynamics of competition in telecommunications. It traces the market dynamics and firm
strategies through the 1990s, as Japan’s domestic telecommunications market became
decoupled from global markets and entrenched in a pattern of leading without followers.
Part III analyzes the substantial transformation in the dynamics of competition since the late
1990s and early 2000s.
2 Leading without followers
First let us expand on how Japan’s telecommunications markets became decoupled from
global markets, despite becoming highly advanced. Four cases best illustrate the massive
opportunity cost for Japanese firms in international markets: 1) ATM switching technology
and ISDN networks; 2) digital cellular handsets; 3) the mobile Internet content ecosystem;
and 4) high-speed broadband, particularly Fiber-To-The-Home (FTTH).
To begin with, the performance of Japanese firms in international telecommunications
equipment markets was never as spectacular as in sectors such as automobiles, consumer
electronics, or semiconductors (Fransman 1995). Nonetheless, in the 1980s, Japanese
manufacturers did enjoy prominence in areas such as cellular handsets, particularly in the
US. The sharp decline of Japan’s telecom equipment exports is one indication of the
domestic market’s decoupling from global markets. Between 1991 and 2001, Japan’s share
of total OECD communication equipment exports by value fell from 27% to 8%, with its
overall telecommunications trade balance shrinking from approximately $10 billion to $4
billion (Cole 2006). As we will see, this was not simply a move towards specializing in
high-end products or off shoring manufacturing. Let us now turn to the cases.
2.1 ATM and ISDN: blindsided by the internet and DSL
First, Japanese firms were at the cutting edge of network technologies and infrastructure of
the pre-Internet era. They became highly competent in ATM technology, hailed worldwide
until the early 1990s as the future of data networking. Japan also led the world in deploying
ISDN communications networks, which boasted a greater ability to carry audio and data
transmission vis-à-vis conventional telephone lines. By 2000, Japan had 9.6 million
household ISDN lines, while the US, with over twice the population, had 1.9 million
(Fig. 1).6 However, by 2000, ISDN infrastructure had been rendered obsolete by the advent
of DSL, which offered far higher transmission speeds over existing copper telephone wires
(ISDN required that existing copper lines be physically replaced.)
Japanese were by no means alone in being blindsided by the advent of the Internet—
almost all global incumbent telecommunications firms were caught unprepared as well.
Silicon Valley startup firm Cisco Systems and, to a lesser extent, Juniper Networks, took
advantage of the situation to move in quickly, capturing dominant global shares of Internet
6 Germany was the only other country that deployed ISDN networks to a similar extent as Japan. See Fig. 1
for the deployment levels.
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backbone and switching equipment. However, Japanese firms had been running particularly
fast along the ATM/ISDN trajectory, and were especially slow to shift course (Cole 2006).
2.2 Cellular handsets: the failed resurgence
Second, from the mid-1990s, Japanese cell phone handsets grew increasingly sophisticated,
leading the world in terms of miniaturization and features.7 However, even as the domestic
market became more sophisticated, Japanese manufacturers’ international presence declined
precipitously. Their global market share by value dropped from approximately 30% in 1990
to less than 5% by 2006—excluding the joint venture Sony Ericsson—but that 5% was
mostly Japan’s domestic market. Sony Ericsson, for its part, actually withdrew from the
Japanese market in 2007 to focus on global markets, revealing the extent to which the
Japanese market had decoupled from global markets (Kushida 2008). In the US cellular
market between 1986 and 1989, Japanese manufacturers had held almost 80% of the
market. However, their shares plummeted to approximately 20% by 1996 (Funk 2002),
dropping precipitously thereafter until by 2006, all major Japanese firms had withdrawn
from the US market.
In the early 2000s, Japanese manufacturers attempted a comeback into global markets
with handsets for third-generation (3G) cellular services. Japanese carriers deployed 3G
networks in 2001, employing global standards, leading many to expect a resurgence of
Japanese handset firms into global markets. However, the bursting of the IT bubble in
2000–2001 delayed 3G deployments around the world by several years. By the time that
3G became commonplace elsewhere, the Japanese market had surged ahead to develop
along a proprietary trajectory, with handset manufacturers competing on the basis of high-
7 Jeffrey Funk documents this trend with data on the precipitous drop in handset size and weight between
1995 and 1998, with Japanese manufacturers’ models miniaturizing faster than those of Nokia. (Funk 2002)
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Fig. 1 ISDN deployment in major OECD countries (millions of subscribers)
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end features useful only in the Japanese market. Commonly referred to within Japan as
“Galapagos,” Japan’s cellphones had evolved along a distinct trajectory in an isolated
ecosystem; the domestic market was still incompatible with global markets despite using
global cellular standards. By 2008, the major manufacturers NEC, Panasonic, and Kyocera
had withdrawn from the US and most other international markets. Sony Ericsson held just
under 3% of the US market in 2008 declining to 1.1% in 2009 (Parker 2010) despite its
focus on global markets.
Yet, this was not simply a matter of Japanese manufacturers failing by pursuing high-end
products in an era of rapid commodification. The advent of Apple’s iPhone spearheaded a
new era of “smartphones” that reshaped the dynamics of competition in cellular markets,
blindsiding all handset manufacturers and carriers around the world (Kenney and Pon
2011). With a different set of business models than incumbent carriers and handset
manufacturers–global and Japanese–Apple’s iPhone with its integrated hardware, operating
system, and App Store, followed by Google’s Android, a smartphone operating system
including an App Marketplace distributed for free, shifted the sector to a new trajectory.
Indeed, many features of the iPhone, such as the camera and Japanese input system, were
initially far inferior to Japanese handsets. Yet, the iPhone became extremely popular in
Japan and Japanese manufacturers, again blindsided, are struggling to adapt.8
2.3 Mobile internet content ecosystem: trapped by domestic platforms
In tandem with Japan’s “Galapagos” handsets, Japan’s ICT sector developed commercially
successful Internet platform services in the late 1990s. Predating Apple’s iPhone and App
Store by almost a decade, these platforms spawned a robust content ecosystem with annual
revenues of almost 3 billion dollars by 2002 and 15 billion by 2009 (DCAJ 2010:203). This
content ecosystem produced several notable new, large Japanese firms that dominated
Japan’s online services markets in areas such as electronic commerce, games, and social
networking services (Kushida 2011; MIC 2010). Yet, this content ecosystem was trapped in
the domestic market since the platforms were only available (on a large scale) in Japan, a
result of the overall failure of Japanese carriers’ attempts to introduce them abroad.
The Apple App Store and Android Marketplace introduced global platforms for content
and applications. While this creates new opportunities for Japanese content providers to
reach global markets, the lost opportunity cost for Japanese firms—in terms of revenue
from the platforms, since Apple charges a 30% share of revenue from App sales, and in
terms of the ability to shape the platform to their own advantage–is substantial.
2.4 High-speed domestic broadband: towards leadership without followers?
Finally, Japan succeeded in fostering market dynamics that led to low cost, high-speed
broadband—the fastest and cheapest worldwide by 2002 (Kushida and Oh 2007). By late
2001, 95% of metropolitan business and residential areas were covered by fiber optic cables
to neighborhood telephone lines, and broadband services with throughput of 100 mbps
were available at approximately $60 per month (compared with 3 to 5 mbps for typical US
consumer broadband at similar price points at the time). In mid-2009, NTT raised its FTTH
8 Japan's smartphone market, beginning with the iPhone’s introduction in 2008, grew to almost 7 million
units in 2010 as the cellular handset market contracted from approximately 50 million in 2007 to 35 million
in 2009. (MM Soken, http://www.m2ri.jp) By the second half of 2011, the majority of new offerings were
smartphones.
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speeds 200 mbps for the same price. An ambitious government plan calls for 100%
household coverage of broadband with speeds greater than 100 mbps by 2014, far
exceeding the goals of places such as the US or EU.9 Japan is clearly a leader in broadband
deployment.
Yet, it is unclear how Japan’s extremely high-speed domestic broadband can be put to
use for domestic development or industrial competitiveness. While the lack of broadband
connectivity can hinder industrial activities and create comparatively disadvantaged
regions, the pursuit of extremely high speeds through expensive infrastructure deployments
entails its own risks. Domestic innovations and services that depend on extremely high
speeds unavailable elsewhere can become trapped in the domestic market. For applications
and services to scale internationally, they must often be optimized for slower speeds.
Instead, high speed domestic broadband may accelerate the diffusion of “killer”
applications from abroad, such as YouTube or Twitter. In attempting to foster domestic
development with high-speed networks, policymakers are discovering that it is difficult to
facilitate the use of high speed broadband in areas such as healthcare and education, since a
variety of laws are involved–more difficult that fostering the network deployment in the
first place (Kushida and Zysman 2009).
3 The development of Japan’s leading without followers telecommunications sector
(late 1800s–late 1990s)
In Japan’s telecommunications sector, the initial configuration of actors and their resources,
the source of technological trajectories and business models, the patterns of interaction
among actors, and the policy orientation of the government date back to the inception of the
sector itself.
3.1 The historical origins of actors, resources, and patterns of interaction
Early government choices in the late 1800s and early 1900s put into place the government
as a monopoly carrier conducting R&D, relying on a closed group of large industrial firms
to provide equipment.
As in many other countries, Japan’s telecommunications sector began with the
government directly operating the networks and services—the Ministry of Communications
(MOC). Rather than producing equipment in-house or through a state-owned company, it
decided to procure equipment from private enterprise. The government actively participated
in creating NEC as a joint venture with Western Electric to receive the latter’s technological
expertise. NEC grew quickly, becoming the primary supplier of Japan’s communications
equipment. NEC retained close government ties, hiring former MOC officials into its
management ranks.
From the late 1920s, MOC instituted competition among a group of equipment suppliers
to decrease its dependence on NEC. The largest of these suppliers became known as the
9 In international comparison, MIC’s plan far exceeds that of the US or EU. In 2009, the US FCC announced
a bold plan to provide 100 million households with similar broadband speeds (100 Mbps downlink, 50 Mbps
uplink), by 2020. It also established a “Connect America Fund” to provide broadband of 4 Mbps as universal
service to all households, but no date specified for implementation. In the EU, the Europe 2020 Strategy
promulgated in 2010 stipulated broadband access for all EU citizens by 2013, with 30 Mbps or greater
speeds for everyone by 2020. 50% or more of those would be 100 Mbps or greater.
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“NTT family” firms, including NEC, Fujitsu, Hitachi, and Oki Electronics.10 The
government aided each firm to develop complex equipment, incentivizing performance
by offering larger procurement orders for higher product quality. MOC sanctioned
disobedience by threatening exclusion from joint development efforts (Fransman 1995).
This carrier-manufacturer relationship pattern entailing a closed group of suppliers with
carrier-led R&D continued after World War II. MOC was dissolved, and Nippon Telephone
and Telegraph (NTT), a fully government-owned monopoly corporation, took over its labs
and staff. NTT’s massive government budget allocations allowed its procurement to
become a de facto subsidy for “family” firms’ R&D in areas beyond telecommunications
equipment, such as semiconductors and consumer electronics. Equipment firms, paid on a
cost-plus basis, competed for NTT’s procurement share based on quality rather than
production cost (Anchordoguy 2001). By the late 1970s, NTT’s procurement budget was
approximately 700 billion yen per year, accounting for up to 40% of the sales for “NTT
family” firms (Prasirtsuk 2001). Although foreign firms had been instrumental in the
prewar creation of most “NTT family” firms, multinational corporations were systemati-
cally excluded from NTT procurement until the 1980s.
3.2 Carrier-led technological trajectories and business models
Since the inception of the sector, the government and NTT determined the technological
trajectories and shaped firms’ business models. In the 1920s, MOC spearheaded efforts to
produce automatic switches domestically rather than relying on imported equipment. It
worked closely with NEC, aided other firms’ R&D efforts, and threatened to sanction firms
that wanted to rely on imported equipment (Fransman 1995).
NTT continued to set the sector’s technological trajectories in the postwar period,
illustrated strongly by the case of digital switches. By the 1960s, NEC had become a world-
class producer of analog switches, and by the mid-1980s its R&D capabilities in this area
were prominent globally. However, as the US moved quickly to adopt digital switches,
NEC and Fujitsu, waiting for NTT’s lead, fell behind decisively in global competition for
digital switches. NTT was in no hurry to adopt digital switches in its domestic market, and
although NEC and Fujitsu did eventually move ahead to develop digital switches, their
need to serve two technologically different markets prevented them from attaining scale or
fully concentrating their R&D efforts on digital switches. When NTT later did eventually
adopt digital switching, it chose a different standard from the US, dooming the Japanese
equipment manufacturers in the US digital switching market (Fransman 1995).11 In sum, as
early as the 1960s, NTT’s ability to set the technological trajectories and shape domestic
firms’ business models began to unhinge the Japanese telecommunications market from
international markets.
The government at this time was a relatively weak regulator, with NTT at the helm
of the sector. In the Allied Occupation government’s immediate postwar reorganization
of Japan’s government, MOC had been disbanded, since it had been a central actor in
prewar and wartime government censorship. The bulk of telecommunications staff and
resources went to NTT, and telecommunications regulation was added to the postal
ministry, creating the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT). MPT had little
11 Fransman (1995) notes that NTT’s relatively late commitment to digital switches in the late 1970s caused
NEC to have to enter the US market with equipment it had not been able to develop and test for the Japanese
market beforehand.
10 Each of these firms initially relied heavily on foreign technology. For details, see Fransman (1995).
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telecommunications expertise, with specialists often seconded from NTT. With few
regulatory controls over NTT, which received budget allocations directly from the
National Diet, MPT was neither a prestigious ministry like the Ministry of Finance
(MOF), nor was it focused on international markets like the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI). NTT dominated the sector, and its domestic-oriented
mandate was to provide geographically equitable communications services to the
domestic market. This situation persisted until 1985.
3.3 The 1985 political juncture reshaping actors and markets
In the mid-1980s, a critical political juncture reshaped the actors, resources, and patterns of
interaction. In 1985, NTT was partially privatized, though it retained its considerable R&D
capabilities. New competitors were allowed into the sector, ending its monopoly. MPT
gained vast regulatory powers, joining NTT in shaping the sector’s technological
trajectories and shaping firms’ business models.
A complicated domestic political debate in the early 1980s led to the sector’s
restructuring. A domestic reform debate focused on privatizing state-owned monopolies
in sectors including tobacco, railways, and telecommunications, escalating as AT&T of the
US was split apart in 1982. The political struggle over telecommunications involved a long
list of actors including NTT, its labor union, politicians in the ruling Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) specializing in telecommunications issues, the opposition Socialist party, Prime
Minister Nakasone’s administrative reform council, MOF, and MPT. A compromise
resulted in NTT’s partial privatization, the introduction of limited competition, and a
postponement of the NTT breakup issue to subsequent debates (Vogel 1996; Johnson 1989;
Kushida 2005).
MPT emerged from this political battle with dramatically strengthened policymaking
powers. It shaped the new entrants, carefully limiting the number of new carriers, and
restricting foreign entry. It shaped firms’ business models through its formal authority to
approve pricing, and through informal administrative guidance that limited the scope of
firms’ business activities; it also segmented the market into areas such as long distance,
local, and cellular, and prohibited firms from engaging in more than one area. MPT gained
new capabilities to undertake R&D, enabling it to shape certain technological trajectories.
MPT was not, however, focused on international markets, legacy of its long institutional
history of regulating domestic activities and prioritizing equitable access to communications
services. This regulatory structure has been referred to as “controlled competition” (Vogel
1996). It was during this era of “controlled competition,” beginning in 1985 and lasting
through the late 1990s, that the pattern of leading without followers became most
entrenched.
3.4 How “controlled competition” caused “leading without followers”: landline services
NTT’s R&D resources were intact and its financing mechanisms were considerable,
enabling it to set the technological trajectory, invest massively in infrastructure, and
dominate manufacturers’ business models.
The degree to which NTT dominated NCCs’ R&D resources is illustrated by comparing
the 30 R&D employees of DDI, the first NCC, with NTT’s 8500 (Fransman 1995).
NTT also enjoyed powerful legacy mechanisms to raise funds in addition to its
monopoly pricing on local communications. For example, it required a 100,000 yen deposit
on all new residential and business lines (rarely refunded). With these resources, NTT was
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slow to shift course and led manufacturers along the ATM technological trajectory that
turned out to be a dead end (Cole 2006).
The regulatory structure constrained NCCs, providing them neither the incentive to
engage in substantial R&D, nor the ability to formulate international strategies. MPT’s tight
control over carriers’ pricing shaped NCCs’ strategies to be only applicable to the domestic
market. In long-distance communications, for example, MPT approved price reductions in a
“lock-step” pattern, allowing NCCs to lower prices to a certain degree before approving
NTT to lower prices to the same level, then approving competitors to lower prices
somewhat more (see Fig. 2). NCCs were protected from predatory pricing by NTT, but
disruptive new business models were unlikely to be approved if deemed excessively
harmful to other carriers by MPT. (Table 1 shows the number of infrastructure-owning
carriers licensed). There were few options for NCCs to differentiate themselves from one
another. Since MPT compartmentalized the market into specific areas, they were precluded
from pursuing global strategies as did British Cable and Wireless, Vodafone, or AT&T.
NTT itself was prohibited from engaging in international services, as stipulated in the
NTT Law that governed its activities, until the law was amended in the late 1990s.
3.5 Towards Japan’s “Galapagos” cellular market
In the mobile sector as well, NTT’s vast resources, in this case combined with MPT’s


























































































































































Fig. 2 Changes on NTT’s and NCC’s call rates (weekday for 3 min)
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3.6 Mobile handset trajectory: miniaturization at all cost
Throughout the 1990s, NTT led manufacturers to pursue miniaturization and sophistication
of cellular handsets, following that trajectory relentlessly until Japan led the world.
However, competition for NTT and NCCs’ procurement orders pulled manufacturers away
from lowering production costs and pursuing global scale.
NTT’s relentless pursuit of miniaturization was actually sparked by foreign competition.
In 1989, DDI, a cellular NCC that had adopted Motorola equipment introduced Motorola’s
MicroTAC handset. The MicroTAC was significantly smaller and lighter than the NTT
models introduced earlier that year. Especially given the historical moment of 1989, when
Japan was at the height of the bubble economy, its electronics firms seemingly poised to
take over the world, NTT’s president was outraged at coming up short. NTT poured
resources into R&D, working with its suppliers and succeeding in introducing handsets,
smaller than Motorola’s by 1991. NTT kept going, continuing to focus its suppliers towards
ever-smaller and sophisticated handsets. NTT had also increased the level of competition
between its suppliers by increasing their autonomy over cosmetic design. (DoCoMo 2001).
As we will see, the distribution practice of NTT purchasing manufacturers’ handsets
outright before selling them to customers enabled NTT to prioritize these performance
attributes over manufacturers’ production cost.
3.7 Mobile carrier business models of the 90s: DoCoMo leveraging the PDC standard
Japan’s choice of PDC, a proprietary digital cellular standard, was significant in Japan’s
cellular isolation. This was not simply due to PDC being an incompatible standard from
others adopted broadly throughout the world, such as GSM and CDMA. Rather, it was
NTT’s ability to create dynamics of competition to sustain its advantage in the domestic
market that firmly entrenched Japan-specific dynamics of competition, thereby pulling
handset manufacturers away from global markets.
PDC was not developed or selected strategically to isolate the domestic market. NTT
had begun developing a digital standard in the late 1980s, before it became clear that
national cellular markets would grow beyond niche products, with markets linked together
through common standards to create global markets. Digital standards used wireless
spectrum more efficiently than analog, and as cellular markets grew by the early 1990s, the
need to shift to digital became a policy issue. At the time, the GSM standard was becoming
popular in Europe, but it required more spectrum—10 MHz–than the 5 MHz allocated to
NCCs. NTT’s PDC standard was designed to require only 5 MHz per carrier, and there
were no other home-grown alternatives, since there was no other concentration of wireless
R&D resources. In the mid-1980s, MPT had been embroiled in US-Japan trade disputes
over allocating spectrum to DDI, which deployed Motorola equipment, and MPT wanted to
avoid another potential dispute if it reopened the issue of spectrum reallocation. Thus, in
1992, MPT adopted NTT DoCoMo’s PDC standard, deployed in 1994 (Kushida 2008).
NTT DoCoMo, a subsidiary of NTT, was spun out in 1991 and received NTT’s wireless
R&D labs. This actor and resource configuration resulted from the complex ongoing
political battle revolving around MPT, which sought to split up NTT, and NTT, which
fought to resist being broken apart. A settlement reached in 1990 spun out NTT’s wireless
division, still a small part of NTT’s business, keeping the rest of NTT largely intact. Many
MPT officials at the time worried about DoCoMo receiving NTT’s wireless labs, fearing
that it would dominate the market, but they could do little since this was a broader political
settlement (Kushida 2008).
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DoCoMo’s R&D resources did indeed enable it to shape the market to its advantage, by
continually upgrading the PDC standard. By doing so, it was setting both the technological
trajectory and shaping the business models of competitors and manufacturers. Although
PDC specifications were public, published and approved by the Association of Radio
Industries and Businesses (ARIB), additional technical stipulations were required for the
commercialization of PDC-based services. Equipment manufacturers were therefore
hostage to information from carriers about their operational specifications. Moreover, since
only DoCoMo had the resources to modify PDC, manufacturers received frequent updates
from DoCoMo’s engineers about upcoming updates. Since DoCoMo and its “family”
manufacturers had early access to information, they rolled out new services and handsets
exactly when ARIB published the new specifications. Many of these modifications dealt
with chipsets and circuitry, decreasing or miniaturizing components to enable smaller
handsets. DoCoMo therefore enjoyed a lineup of handsets that were smaller and more
advanced than those of competing carriers,12 and “NTT family” handset manufacturers
enjoyed a competitive edge over others, such as Kyocera, Toshiba, Sanyo, Sony, and the
foreign manufacturers such as Nokia and Motorola.
DoCoMo further shaped the business models of “family” handset manufacturers by
prohibiting the latter from selling their DoCoMo handsets to others for several months.13
Even for component manufacturers, development projects between DoCoMo and its
manufacturers usually included non-disclosure agreements signed by components manu-
facturers, prohibiting them from disclosing details or selling the new components to non -
family handset manufacturers, typically for 6 months. Since new models appeared almost
every month, DoCoMo suppliers held an advantage, pushing non-family manufacturers to
differentiate themselves in attributes other than those conferred by updates to PDC, such as
design and handset feature.
NTT’s traditional procurement practices further shaped carrier-manufacturer relations,
creating manufacturers’ Japan-specific business models that hindered the latter’s potential
global strategies. Carriers purchasing handsets from manufacturers became the standard
industry practice, entailing large commissions to retailers. Competition among carriers
escalated commission levels, which reached over 70% of the cost for top class handsets,
and virtually 100% for other models. Similar dynamics occurred elsewhere in the world,
especially after the turn of the century, but Japanese carriers’ subsidies reached 300–400
dollars by the mid-1990s, without multiple year binding contracts. This put them on a
different footing from global markets, where manufacturers like Nokia and Motorola, which
focused on lowering production costs to sell handsets directly to consumers around the
world.
Frequent updates to PDC and fast cycles of handset renewals prevented handset
manufacturers from attaining large scale production, since their efforts were focused on
obtaining procurement orders based on design and new features.14 The domestic market
became a steady source of revenue for manufacturers, but their R&D resources were taxed
by the constant demands from carriers for new high-end features and frequent handset
model updates. The short lifecycles of handsets further precluded an automatic spillover
from the domestic market to global markets (Kushida 2008).
12 Funk (2002) documents how size differentials between DoCoMo and non-DoCoMo handsets remained
significant for several years until around 1998.
14 Each handset model was built from the ground up, rather than sharing platforms across models, as Nokia
or automobile manufacturers build their products.
13 This practice led to an investigation by the Japan Fair Trade Commission in April, 1999 (Yuasa 2000).
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3.8 PHS: Japan’s proprietary mobile services driven by MPT’s industrial policy
MPT’s rise as a ministry capable of shaping the sector’s technological trajectories
accelerated the isolation of Japan’s mobile sector by orchestrating the creation of the
Personal Handyphone System (PHS). PHS services were the brainchild of MPT, which
assumed in the early 1990s that conventional cellular services would remain prohibitively
expensive for ordinary consumers. Technologically simpler than cellular services, PHS
influenced the dynamics of competition in Japan’s mobile sector by offering smaller and
cheaper handsets with clearer voice communications, higher data transmission speeds, and
lower service prices. As cellular carriers scrambled to meet the competitive challenges from
PHS, they intensified efforts that ended up pushing Japan’s cellular sector along its
proprietary trajectory.
MPT spearheaded the R&D into PHS, conducting field experiments and setting the
technical standard. MPT shaped the PHS carriers by directing existing cellular carriers to
obtain licenses, resulting in three consortia and joint ventures.15 Foreign firms were
strategically kept out of the standard-setting process, with the PHS specifications becoming
public at the same time services began commercial operations in 1995 (Funk 2002).
PHS markets grew rapidly, becoming a major threat to cellular carriers, forcing them to
concentrate their efforts on lowering service prices, increasing voice quality and coverage,
miniaturizing handsets, adding extra functionality, and increasing commissions to lower
consumer upfront costs. In the end, cellular services and handsets caught up and
overshadowed PHS, but PHS indisputably accelerated the trajectory of miniaturization,
sophistication, and a push towards heavily subsidized high-end handsets–“Galapagos.”16
3.9 Japan’s cellular “Galapagos”: cellular internet platform services and ecosystem
Arguably the most dramatic case of Japan’s telecommunications sector leading without
followers was its pioneering innovation of commercially successful cellular Internet
platform services. These platform services spawned a robust mobile content market, and an
array of advanced cellular handsets co-evolved with the platforms. This ecosystem of
platforms, content, and handsets developed rapidly from the late 1990s, but the entire
ecosystem was confined to Japan’s domestic market.
While politics and government policies did not directly create Japan’s cellular Internet
platforms, the latter grew out of the policy-shaped proprietary market dynamics. Since the
unintended consequences of government policy provided DoCoMo with decisive
advantages in Japan’s cellular markets from the mid-1990s, competitors desperately sought
new strategies. At the same time, by the late 1990s PHS service providers, facing declining
subscription levels, turned to Short Message Services (SMS). The popularity of SMS
revealed significant latent demand for such message-based services (Suzuki et al. 2005). In
15 They included NTT Personal Communication Network (a joint venture between NTT and its wireless
subsidiary, NTT DoCoMo), DDI Pocket (a subsidiary of DDI), and Astel (a consortium including Japan
Telecom and KDD)
16 PHS services eventually declined in competitiveness vis-à-vis cellular handsets and services, as cellular
carriers and manufactures closed the gap in size, usability, and price. Moreover, NTT was able to charge
predatory prices to PHS carriers dependent on its public network infrastructure, squeezing the profits of PHS
carriers. After peaking in 1998, the number of PHS subscribers declined, leaving only one in the market.
Having essentially given up on PHS technology, manufacturers opened the intellectual property to Chinese
carriers, which precipitated a boom in regional Chinese cities—an interesting story in and of its own (Suzuki
et al. 2005)
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this industry environment, the cellular carriers began a race to develop cellular Internet
services of some form.17
Japanese carriers, particularly DoCoMo, pioneered a new Internet connection service
business model that became commercially successful, widely lauded by the early 2000s by
business analysts, scholars, and market research firms such as Gartner (Beck 2003; Ratliff
2002; Murase 2003; Mitsuyama 2003). Most analyses credit DoCoMo, but in fact the
Japanese cellular industry environment that focused carriers on this search of a new cellular
Internet business model is an underappreciated, but critical driver (Kushida 2010).
The three nation-wide cellular carriers pursued independent technological paths, and
DoCoMo actually lagged behind for much of the race.18 J-Phone was the first to roll out a
cellular information service, Sky-walker, in late 1997, taking DoCoMo by surprise.
DoCoMo’s president at the time, Koji Ohboshi, was reportedly furious about falling behind
in the race. When J-Phone rolled out an early, text-only version of its cellular Internet
service in December 1998, DoCoMo again lagged.19
In early 1999 DoCoMo introduced its i-mode service, with an innovative business model
involving profit-sharing with third party content providers. i-mode and the others were
“open-but-owned” platforms–open in that third parties could create content independently,
but owned by carriers who controlled and charged for the gateway to the content (Vogel and
Zysman 2002). i-mode subscription fees were low, at 300 yen per month.20 A portal menu
listed “official” content approved by the carrier. “Official” content providers could charge
subscription fees ranging from 100 to 300 yen, integrated into carriers’ monthly cellular
billing statements. Carriers took a percentage of this monthly fee, initially 9% (Funk 2002).
This solved the payment problem for content providers, particularly since credit card use in
Japan was relatively low at the time. “Unofficial” content could be accessed anywhere on
the Internet if written in a proprietary simplified form of the html language used for
websites. Carriers charged users for data transmissions, decreasing their incentive to make
the platform closed since they benefitted from traffic to “unofficial” sites as well. Internet
email quickly became the first “killer application,” providing most Japanese consumers’
first experience with “always on” Internet and email access.
DoCoMo pioneered this business model, and its competitors followed closely with
equivalent business models. Their use of different underlying technologies and networks to
quickly roll out similar services reveals their focus on this race.21
Japan’s close carrier-manufacturer ties enabled carriers to introduce their Internet
platform services concurrently with an array of compatible handsets. This solved the
chicken and egg problem found in other countries, in which carriers and manufacturers
waited for each other to make the first move (Funk 2001). The popularity of Internet
18 Tokyo Digital Phone (later J-Phone) went to a research lab in Keio University; IDO (later KDDI) joined
the Wireless Access Protocol (WAP) forum assembled by the American firm Unwired Planet; and DoCoMo
strengthened ties to Access, a Japanese startup software company.
19 Kontentsu kakumei no kishu tachi: “kokusaikijun” de dokomo ni taikou. 2003. Nihon Keizai Shimbun,
October 8, 5.; Kontentsu kakumei no kishu tachi: shanai benchaa, nankan toppa. 2003. Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, October 9, 5.; Kontentsu kakumei no kishu tachi: shameru de onnagokoro tsukamu. 2003. Nihon
Keizai Shimbun, October 10, 5.
17 They were also following a worldwide consensus that this would be the next direction for mobile services.
21 DoCoMo introduced i-mode in February 1999, KDDI followed with EZWeb that April, and J-Phone with
J-Sky in December. DoCoMo constructed an entirely new, nationwide packet-switched network while KDDI
used a CDMA-based Motorola equipment network, and J-Phone used a circuit switched PDC network from
NTT family firms.
20 Approximately 3 USD at $1 = 100 yen.
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platform services drove carriers’ revenue sources towards income from data packet
transmissions. For example DoCoMo derived 10% of its monthly average revenue per user
from i-mode in the first quarter of 2001, which grew to almost 25% 2 years later. This was a
business model departure from other advanced industrial countries.
Since the cellular Internet platforms existed only in the domestic market, the content
ecosystem and advanced handsets were trapped in the domestic market. DoCoMo did
attempt to take i-mode internationally, purchasing minority stakes in several overseas
carriers, including AT&T Wireless in the US, KPN Mobile in the Netherlands and carriers
in other, mostly small European countries. However, DoCoMo was unable to influence its
partners to adopt the entire ecosystem of platform services, handset manufacturers and
content providers. In the case of AT&T Wireless, DoCoMo failed to convince it to adopt
DoCoMo’s i-mode variant as an open platform. Moreover, when the IT bubble burst in the
early 2000s, DoCoMo sustained massive equity losses–812 billion yen in the fiscal year
2001. DoCoMo then shifted to a cautious licensing strategy, mostly in Europe, but the
dearth of i-mode capable handsets prevented widespread adoption (Mitsuyama 2003).
In the meantime, as cellular Internet services continued to grow rapidly in the Japanese
market, reaching 67 million out of 80 million cellular subscribers by December 2003
(TCA), Internet service quickly became the focal point of competition among carriers. The
sector literally began to take on a Galapagos-like appearance, with exotic new shapes, sizes,
and features of cellphone handsets not found elsewhere.
In this isolated but highly competitive domestic market environment, DoCoMo was
increasingly a follower. J-Phone was the global pioneer of camera-embedded phones in 2001; a
major service innovation was its function enabling users to email pictures. J-Phone had worked
closely with Sharp, a manufacturer without strong ties to DoCoMo. It took DoCoMo
approximately a year to offer similar services and orchestrate manufacturers’ introduction of
camera-embedded handsets. KDDI was first to market with downloadable songs, “chaku-uta,”
which became immensely popular, logging 5 million downloads 16 months after its
introduction in late 2004, closing in on the number of CD singles sold in mid-2006 (Masuno
2006). DoCoMo was again a follower in this area, but led in other areas such as
micropayments through IC card-embedded handsets and downloadable Java applets to run
small software applications. The industry catapulted towards new services, such as the
capability to display digital television broadcasts, biometric scanners to protect access, and
various GPS-enabled applications and services before they became standard elsewhere. In sum,
despite adopting a global standard and attempting to internationalize its services, the dynamics
of competition in Japan’s cellular industry propelled it along a proprietary trajectory.
4 Regulatory shifts and market disruptions: moving beyond leading
without followers?
Regulatory reforms in the late 1990s, consisting of a combination of deregulation and
reregulation, opened the way for major shifts in the competitive dynamics of Japan’s
telecommunications sector. The actors, their resources, the sources of technological
trajectories and business models, as well as the patterns of intra-industry and
government-business interactions all underwent substantial shifts. A new regulatory focus
on international competitiveness and global markets led to policies deliberately aimed at
reshaping the domestic sector. Yet, several continuities remained—most importantly NTT
as a cohesive actor with considerable, though diminished, financial resources, and extensive
R&D resources.
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4.1 The regulatory “regime shift”
Major regulatory shifts in the late 1990s embodied a change in MPT’s orientation from ex
ante competition management to governing the industry on an ex post basis (Kushida
2006). The shifts entailed deregulation, relaxation of rules, and re-regulation, meaning the
creation and implementation of new rules and organizations.22 The regulatory shifts
occurred over several years, and in piecemeal fashion. The deregulation was driven by a
normative shift within the ministry, supported by the political environment (Kushida 2011).
It was not simply the result of pressure from business groups, foreign governments, or
international organizations.
In several steps starting in 1998, MPT lowered the entry barriers for new firms and
allowed foreign ownership of network infrastructure. MPT also relaxed its control over
pricing and decompartmentalized the sector, freeing carriers to pursue multiple business
areas.23
4.2 A new cast of actors: merged, new, and foreign
A political agreement between MPT and NTT in 1995 led to a settlement that reshaped
NTT into a holding company (Kawabata 2006; Vogel 2000). Overall, however, the
company retained a high level of coherence. For example, it transferred excess personnel
from the loss-making local carriers NTT East and NTT West to the profitable NTT
DoCoMo. Importantly, it retained its R&D capabilities and the capacity for long-range
planning.
The decompartmentalization of the sector paved the way for consolidation among NCCs.
In 2000, a merger among several NCCs (KDD, DDI, and IDO) created KDDI, the largest
competitor to NTT in landline, wireless, broadband, and international services.24
Deregulation also allowed new entrants into the sector, many of whom introduced new
technologies, disruptive business models, and new patterns of interaction, as shown later.
New entrants included startup firms as well as foreign multinational firms.
In 2001, a sequence of events involving Vodafone, a British carrier with a major global
presence, revealed how far deregulation had opened the Japanese telecommunications
market. Vodafone purchased a major NCC, Japan Telecom, which owned one of the three
nationwide cellular carriers, J-Phone. It was the largest inward M&A deal in Japan’s history
at the time. Vodafone split off and sold Japan Telecom’s landline division to US investment
fund Ripplewood, who in turn sold it to Softbank, a new entrant into the sector. Softbank’s
acquisition of major network infrastructure in a single transaction was unprecedented in the
sector. In 2006, Vodafone exited Japan (at a profit), selling its mobile operations and
infrastructure, again to Softbank, at the time Japan’s largest leveraged buyout (Kushida
22 Vogel (1996) differentiates between deregulation and reregulation as components of liberalization, an
increase in the overall level of competition.
23 See Fuke (2000) for an overview. By 2003, the ministry had abolished its entire regulatory apparatus for
classification, registration and notification.
24 KDD had been a government-owned corporation monopolizing international communications until its
privatization in 1984. After deregulation in 1998, it was allowed to enter other areas, and was no longer a
designated special corporation governed by the KDD Law, which was abolished that year. It merged with
Teleway Japan, an international service firm with Toyota as the primary investor. DDI was the first NCC set
up in 1985, with a set of cellular subsidiaries in Western Japan. IDO was a cellular NCC with major
investments from Toyota.
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2010). Therefore, in sharp contrast to the stable actors of the 1980s and 1990s, the 2000s
saw not only one of the three nationwide cellular carriers becoming a foreign firm, but by
2006, a completely new entrant had utilized advanced financial tools to become a
nationwide landline and wireless carrier. Softbank, unlike the original NCCs, was neither a
subsidiary nor close affiliate of Japan’s major industries firms; it was a new breed of
independent Japanese startup firm.
4.3 New technological trajectories: the internet, broadband, and mobile disruptions
Starting with the coming of age of the Internet, NTT and MPT began to lose their ability to
define the sector’s technological trajectory to new entrants, foreign and domestic. First, as
the Internet became widely popular around the world in the mid-1990s with the advent of
the World Wide Web, a new market of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) grew rapidly in
Japan. Many would have preferred to buy from familiar Japanese equipment manufacturers
such as NEC or Fujitsu. However, the Japanese manufacturers, in pursuing ATM, lacked a
product lineup of backbone equipment and routers based on the Internet’s TCP/IP
protocols, a fundamental different design paradigm. As it did most everywhere else, Cisco
took the opportunity to enter Japan and dominate the market for Internet equipment. Japan’s
router market grew from 55 billion yen in 1995 to 202 billion yen in 2002, and Cisco’s
share between 1999 and 2001 was estimated at over 80% for high end and over 70% for
mid-range routers.25
New entrants also spearheaded the introduction of DSL, a technology that disrupted
NTT’s plans to utilize ISDN until it completed a nationwide fiber-optic network rollout.
Pioneered by startup firm Tokyo Metallic, others quickly followed and DSL rapidly grew in
popularity–eventually forcing NTT to delay its fiber strategy and deploy its own DSL
services (Kushida 2011). DSL was disruptive to NTT not only because it offered far higher
transmission speeds than ISDN, but because it could be deployed over conventional copper
lines to offer flat-rate unlimited access. This challenged NTT’s ISDN business model to
charge per minute, and moreover, NTT had to physically restore copper wires to the
prospective DSL subscribers who had already switched to ISDN.
In mobile, the advent of the iPhone in 2007 and the rapidly expanding market for
“smartphones,” decisively shifted the technological trajectory away from Japan’s high-end
but proprietary “Galapagos” handsets and cellular Internet platforms. By 2009, the iPhone
held over 70% of Japan’s fast growing smartphone market, with Taiwan’s HTC in second
with 11%, and Toshiba and Canada’s Research In Motion following them with single digits.
While the initial iPhones had a significant proportion of Japanese components, the
technological trajectory in terms of design and software were clearly led by Apple.
4.4 New sources of business models: new entrants, NCCs, foreign firms at center stage
New entrants introduced new, disruptive business models unthinkable under the “controlled
competition” regulatory regime. We already noted how a few DSL startups brought
disruptive technologies and flat-rate, high-speed broadband to Japan. After the government
actively strengthened regulations over NTT, improving the terms for DSL startups to utilize
25 Cisco does not release Japan-specific market shares. Estimates from the Fair Trade Commission of Japan.
(Tanaka and Murakami 2003). By the early 2000s, Cisco and Juniper enjoyed approximately 80% of the
global market for Internet routers and switching equipment.
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NTT’s infrastructure and lowering leasing fees, Softbank entered the business and delivered
a game-changing price shock; in August 2001 it offered DSL at half the prevailing price.
This created headlines and raised the profile of DSL, leading to its rapid growth. DSL
subscribers grew from just under 300,000 in the months preceding Softbank’s DSL service,
to 8.2 million by June 2003. Observers at the time, including ministry officials, were
concerned that Softbank’s strategy was reckless and even irresponsible, as it initially
incurred major losses.26 Softbank’s sales tactics were particularly aggressive as well,
employing temporary workers to canvass metropolitan areas with temporary booths that
gave free 100 plus dollar value DSL home routers to new subscribers.
Softbank followed its DSL price shock with an attack on Japan’s conventional
telephone pricing. In early 2002, it began bundling free telephone-replacement Voice
over Internet Protocol (VoIP) with its DSL subscriptions. VoIP technology sends voice
signals over the Internet, circumventing the traditional telephone switching network, but
most popular forms, such as Skype, require a computer on one end. Softbank’s service
was aimed directly at replacing NTT telephone subscriptions, entailing users connecting
their existing telephone sets into Softbank’s home DSL router. Softbank allowed free
unlimited calls between Softbank IP telephony subscribers, and extremely low rates for
international calls—the first time mainstream Japanese consumers experienced flat-rate
telephony.27 VoIP then received regulatory support in the form of telephone number
allocations, becoming a valuable lever for DSL, and later, FTTH broadband services
provided by NTT’s competitors.
Japan’s new market for FTTH services was strongly shaped by the low priced DSL
market. Usen, another new entrant, pioneered Japan’s FTTH in 2001, at prices comparable
to DSL before the Softbank’s price shock–about half of what NTT had planned to charge.
While the sudden, explosive growth of DSL delayed Usen’s plans for a broader FTTH
rollout, the availability of extremely high speed FTTH forced NTT to offer its own FTTH at
similarly low rates.
While the Japanese government’s failure to completely break up NTT provided it the
financial strength to deploy FTTH nationwide (Ida 2009), MPT’s classic industrial policy
measures since the early 1990s actually supported competitors’ fiber deployments. Low-
interest loans through the Development Bank of Japan, and subsidized interest payments
through a semi-public entity, the Telecommunications Advancement Organization, were
among the measures that facilitated building of NCCs’ own fiber networks.28 Thus, by the
time that DSL was spreading rapidly in the early 2000s, NTT and several NCCs had built
extensive fiber networks, but their service business models, offering low fees and searching
for value through other services, were shaped by Softbank’s unexpected DSL price shocks.
In mobile as well, NTT and MPT no longer shaped the sector’s business models. PHS
services, suffering market shrinkage as cellular services took over, shrank to one carrier.
However, this carrier, DDI Pocket, began offering flat-rate mobile data services, the first of
its kind, in 2001. In 2003, KDDI pioneered flat rate data plans for cellular Internet
platforms, forcing DoCoMo and Vodafone to follow suit in 2004. This undermined a major
revenue driver of the original DoCoMo-pioneered business model–charging for data traffic.
Competitors also challenged the DoCoMo-pioneered revenue model for mobile Internet
platforms of relying heavily on subscriptions to “official” content. In mid-2006, KDDI
26 By 2005 Softbank’s DSL business became profitable.
27 For details, see Kushida and Ogata (2007).
28 By 1999, over 75 billion yen worth of loans had been allocated.
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began including a Google search bar on its portal, leading DoCoMo and Softbank (which
had bought Vodafone’s operations) to partner with other search engines such as Yahoo. By
early 2007, an estimated 70% of mobile Internet sites were “unofficial” sites, a growing
proportion of which were supported by advertising rather than subscription fees.29 Finally,
by 2008, it was clear that the iPhone and Android application markets would become the
dominant global mobile content platforms, and the entire content ecosystem has begun
rapidly shifting direction to ride these global platforms.
4.5 New patterns of interaction: price wars, litigation, and manufacturer consolidation
New entrants and the shifting dynamics of competition introduced new patterns of intra-
industry and government-business coordination.
In intra-industry coordination, the price shocks and new technologies by new entrants
were a radical departure from the government-managed lock-step price decreases during the
“controlled competition” era. The telecommunications ministry also removed itself from the
center of intra-industry negotiations over issues such as interconnection fees by creating the
Dispute Resolution Commission, an organization located within the ministry, but designed
to resolve disputes between firms in a publicly open fashion. Its first ruling were against
NTT in cases brought by DSL startups.
In government-business relations, the most dramatic shift took the form of litigation
against the government. In 2003, a group of five carriers, led by KDDI, sued the Ministry
of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC–which had taken over telecommunications
regulation from MPT) in 2000. It was the sector’s first administrative litigation, and the
plaintiffs included Japan Telecom, then majority owned by Vodafone, startup firms
Powerdcom and Fusion Communications, and British-Japanese joint venture Cable &
Wireless IDC. The direct issue was MIC allowing NTT to raise its telephony
interconnection rates, but the lawsuit was as importantly a warning against nascent political
maneuvers, hinting that MIC might allow NTT to fiber network access rates critical to
FTTH providers. While the case was ultimately dismissed 2 years later, if signaled to the
government that firms would no longer tolerate politicized or opaque policymaking
(Kushida 2010).
In 2004, Softbank launched the sector’s second administrative litigation as it attempted
to obtain wireless spectrum. MIC’s allocation of the 800 MHz spectrum band was
underway, and Softbank called for an injunction, calling for new, publically open allocation
methods. Softbank’s president criticized MIC-carrier relations, contending that their
negotiations behind closed doors went hand in hand with incumbents hiring retired MIC
officials. Two months later, Softbank rescinded the lawsuit when MIC convened a study
group to examine the issue. While the 800 MHz allocation proceeded as planned, the
following year three new entrants, including Softbank, were allocated licenses in the
1.7 GHz spectrum range. In another unprecedented move, Softbank returned the spectrum
license upon acquiring Vodafone’s Japan operations (NikkeiCommunications 2005). Since
MIC had given up most of its powerful discretionary powers to shape the sector, firms were
freer to openly challenge its decisions and processes.
In the mobile sector, intra-industry consolidation began to shift as carriers’ dominance
over handset manufacturers eroded and a wave of consolidation swept through handset
29 See Keitai Denwa: Sony, Docomo muke tettai [Cellular phones: Sony withdrawing from supplying
DoCoMo] 2008.
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manufacturers. By the mid 2000s, Japan’s cellphone industry approached saturation, growth
slowed, and manufacturers’ profitability declined precipitously. In March 2007, the total
profits of carriers was 1.3 trillion yen, while that of the 11 handset manufacturers combined
was only approximately 0.3 trillion.30 This led to demands by manufacturers for
independent branding, and traditional “NTT family” relationships and carrier-
manufacturer grouping broke down. Table 2 shows the groupings of carriers and
manufacturers in 2006. NTT family firms Panasonic and Fujitsu supplied DoCoMo
exclusively, and NEC supplied DoCoMo and Vodafone, but not DoCoMo’s biggest rival,
KDDI. Conversely, non-NTT family firms Sony Ericsson, Toshiba, and Casio supplied
KDDI, but not DoCoMo. In 2007, however, Panasonic and NEC began offering handsets to
KDDI and Softbank. Around the same time, Sharp introduced handsets under its own
brand, rather than that of the carrier, to DoCoMo–which had never procured from Sharp
before–and KDDI.31 Sharp had leveraged the extreme popularity of its “Aquos” brand
handsets, optimized for viewing digital television, in the slowing market. Table 3 shows
how the carrier-manufacturer grouping all but disappeared.
Vodafone attempted to reshape Japan’s handset market by forging a new connection
between the Japanese and global markets. It had reduced the number of its suppliers,
promising NEC, Sanyo, and Toshiba that they could attain global scale by serving
Vodafone’s international markets. To this end, Vodafone abandoned J-Phone’s previous
lineup of proprietary Japanese standards with “global standard” handsets in 2002. However,
to Japanese consumer these handsets appeared be a step backwards in functionality and
usability. By 2004, Vodafone’s Japan market share had slipped markedly, with a net
subscriber loss.
A major wave of consolidation swept manufacturers. Until 2008, an astonishing eleven
major Japanese firms provided handsets. By 2010, this had shrunk to five, with mergers
between Kyocera and Sanyo, NEC, Casio and Hitachi, and Fujitsu and Toshiba, and the
exit of Mitsubishi (see Table 3). These mergers followed several tie-ups in manufacturers’
development processes, previously been atomized within each firm, as software
development costs skyrocketed in tandem with greater handset sophistication.32
4.6 Government orientation: aiming towards global markets
As Japan’s telecommunications markets grew increasingly isolated, with the opportunity
costs of missing the Internet and rapidly expanding global cellular markets worldwide
becoming clear, MIC began focusing on international competitiveness and global markets.
While it had been careful to adopt global 3G standards in the late 1990s to avoid a repeat of
the PDC standard driving isolation, it saw that proprietary market dynamics continued to
isolate the domestic market. A ministry deliberation council first articulated the notion of
32 For example, KDDI began working with Toshiba, Sanyo, and Qualcomm to create a common operating
system for handsets in its services. Until then, each manufacturer had been making its own software. The
goal was to reduce R&D costs for software to less than one third, since a majority of the estimated 10 to 20
million yen for developing a new handset was in software. This facilitated manufacturers who had not been
supplying KDDI, such as Panasonic and NEC, to do so. “‘au‘keitai sofuto kyotsuka [‘au’ to facilitate
common software.]” Nihon Keizai Shimbun. July 19, 2006.
31 Until then, handsets were only branded with the carrier, and a letter designation in the model number
indicated the manufacturer.
30 “Yuragu tsushingaisha yuui: shouhish shuyaku, kadenkei ga hiyaku [The swaying advantage in
communications firms: consumers as the main character, household electronics manufacturers leaping
ahead].” Nihon Keizai Shimbun. July 12, 2007. p. 13.
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“Galapagos” cellular markets in a 2007 report, and various policy initiatives were aimed at
reshaping the domestic market to create a better fit with global markets (MIC 2007).
Some measures designed to increase the level of competition, however, actually ended
up driving Japan’s cellular market further along its proprietary trajectory. In October 2006,
MIC implemented “number portability,” enabling consumers to keep their telephone
numbers after changing carriers. MIC’s aim was to reduce the subscriber lock-in effect that
deterred users from changing carriers. DoCoMo, with the largest subscriber base, was the
major beneficiary of this lock-in. Carriers’ responses were, however, to accelerate their
development of proprietary features to create new lock-in effects. As the date for number
portability approached, carriers engaged in a massive push towards electronic money, music
players, thumbprint scans, ever high resolution cameras, and digital television broadcast
receivers. As it turned out, widely used elements such as email addresses with carrier-
specific domain names, data from various applications, song downloads, games, and other
content were widely used, but not “portable.” After a year, only 3% of consumers took
advantage of number portability33—a sharp contrast to AT&T Wireless of the US, which
experienced an exodus of subscribers as soon as number portability was introduced in 2003,
leading to the carrier’s rapid demise.
In 2007, MIC attempted explicitly to shift the dynamics of competition to better align
them with international markets. MIC’s deliberation council, the “Mobile Business Study
Group,” recommended that handset subsidies be abolished and SIM cards be “unlocked,”
allowing the same handset to work on different carriers. The experience of South Korea was
raised, where a ban on handset subsidies led manufacturers to pursue international
markets.34
Carriers reacted preemptively upon learning of this report. In late 2007, they
announced new fee structures, offered in parallel to existing fee structures. Consumers
could choose whether to pay higher communications fees and receive traditionally
subsidized handsets, or pay slightly lower communication fees in exchange for lower
Table 2 Japanese handset manufacturers, 2006
DoCoMo KDDI Vodafone
Panasonic O X X
NEC O X O
Fujitsu O X X
Sanyo O O X
Sharp O X O
Sony Ericsson O O X
Toshiba X O O
Casio X O X
Hitachi X O X
Kyocera X O X
Mitsubishi O O X
O indicates the manufacturer supplies that carrier, X indicates it does not (adapted from Nikkei 7.19.2006)
33 (Keitai norikae 3% todomari [Cell phone carrier shifting remains at 3%] 2007)
34 For details on the South Korean experience, see Kushida (2008)
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subsidies and 2 year contracts. The resulting highly complex menu of fee structures and
options bewildered consumers, and carriers avoided being forced to shift entirely to
new fee structures. This contributed to a slowdown in handset turnover, but the advent
of the iPhone and era of “smartphones” shifted the global trajectory of handsets before
Japanese manufacturers could use the new domestic dynamics of competition to launch
new international strategies.
4.7 Residual leading without followers: NTT’s next generation network
There are, however, still several residual threats of leading without followers in Japan’s
telecommunications markets. By far the most significant was NTT’s “Next Generation
Network” (NGN) strategy. From around 2006, NTT began heavily marketing its “Next
Generation Network,” commercializing it in 2008 to much (Japanese) media fanfare. The
NGN consisted of an entirely new fiber network that replaced NTT’s existing Internet
backbone and network infrastructure. While the conventional Internet ran on the NGN, it
offered several additional built-in features: VoIP with guarantees on throughput (Quality of
Service) to allow high resolution video conferencing, security measures enabling data
packet to be traced to their origin, and enhanced security for Virtual Private Networks for
corporations. Both the upload and download speeds were between 100 and 160 Mbps.
Security and quality of service are serious concerns for the current Internet architecture,
and NTT’s strategy to was avoid becoming simply a commodity provider of Internet access
by addressing these concerns at a network infrastructure level. NTT also planned to
combine its various networks–conventional telephone, Internet backbone, and mobile–into
the NGN. To this end, NTT invested approximately a fourth of its capital expenditures on
NGN–in 2007 alone totaling 4.4 billion yen.
NTT’s NGN was, however, not only proprietary to Japan, but it was also closed. Firms
were required to sign contracts with NTT to offer applications or services taking advantage
of NGN’s enhanced features. The NGN was not allowed to become an open playground for
experimentation in the manner of the Internet; it was intended as a platform for services and
applications requiring high levels of security and reliability, such as healthcare,
government, education, high resolution video conferencing, and Virtual Private Networks.
By November 2008, however, the only commercial service introduced specifically for NGN
was a video conferencing system from NEC, costing about $10,000. Government strategies
to implement new IT tools in these same areas of healthcare, government, and education
refocused on “Cloud Computing” solutions, in which the sophistication is at the providers’
datacenter rather than in the network—a different trajectory entirely from what NTT was
Table 3 Japanese handset manufacturers, 2010
DoCoMo KDDI Softbank
Panasonic O O O
NEC Casio (absorbed Hitachi) O O O
Fujitsu Toshiba O O O
Sharp O O O
Kyocera (absorbed Sanyo) X O X
Sony Ericsson X O X
O indicates the manufacturer supplies that carrier, X indicates it does not
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pursuing (MIC 2010).35 Facing this decisive lack of enthusiasm, NTT quietly dropped its
NGN marketing campaign emphasizing its special features, repositioning it simply as a
high speed FTTH service.
5 Conclusion
This paper has explained Japan’s persistent pattern of leading without followers in the
telecommunications sector. It contends that competitive dynamics, shaped by the
configuration of actors, the source of technological trajectories and business models, the
patterns of intra-industry and government-business interactions, and the government’s
orientation towards international markets pushed Japan’s telecommunications sector to ever
higher levels of sophistication, even as it became decoupled from global markets. The
configuration of these factors originated in the historical establishment of the sector, and
political dynamics reshaped them over time (see Table 4). Japan’s telecommunications
isolation was not simply a product of proprietary standards, since even after it adopted
global standards, the dynamics of competition kept the sector incompatible with global
markets. It went deeper than simply misguided corporate strategies, since the dynamics of
competition created a situation in which winning in the domestic market led to losing in
global markets–what we might call the “Galapagos effect.” And it is not an unambiguously
negative narrative about government choices or strategies. While a richer analysis of the
politics driving the key policies will be left to longer publications, this analysis has shown
that political processes, at key junctures, which often trumped bureaucratic strategy,
structured and restructured the actors and regulatory environment. The unintended
consequences of these political outcomes led to the particular dynamics of competition
that isolated the domestic market. Overall, this analysis breaks down notions of a
monolithic policymaking logic, highlighting the complex interplay between the logic of
politics and the interests of elite bureaucrats, with the resulting industry structures that
shape competitive dynamics.
Japan’s pattern of leading without followers is certainly a story of platforms. It reveals
the importance of platform providers’ international business strategies including the ability
to bring complementary elements of the broader ecosystem abroad as well—in this case
handsets and the content ecosystem. This observation goes beyond Japan, and transcends
telecommunications, since most large service providers in a variety of sectors evolved from
national contexts, and because services are generally greatly influenced by the rules,
regulations, and social normative factors (Zysman et al. 2011).
This leads to a point about services versus products. When products are valuable only if
coupled with particular services, then the logic of competition surrounding services will
determine the competitiveness of products. When the logic of services competition cannot be
carried beyond the domestic market, then products can become trapped. Apple, a new entrant
without vested interests in existing services or communications products, solved this problem by
integrating its own platform into its products, plowing through diverse national network services
markets by commoditizing the network services on which its products and platforms run.36
The key factor in Japan’s telecommunications sector is NTT with its vast resources,
which drove much of Japan’s pattern of leading without followers. The advent of the
36 For example, an iPhone or Android user cares about the functionality of their device and the services of
the Apple App Store or Android App Market rather than functions provided by specific carriers—AT&T,
Verizon, or Softbank, for example.
35 For an overview of Cloud Computing, see (Kushida 2011)
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Internet was the beginning of NTT’s loss of ability to set technological trajectories and
business models. However, the transformation of Japan’s telecommunications sector was
not simply a story of technological inevitability–politics and regulatory shifts continued to
shape the actors, technological possibilities, and business models. For example,
deregulation by MPT, driven by the political logic within and surrounding the ministry,
shaped the timing of new entrants. Quick regulatory support, by no means inevitable, aided
specific technologies and business models such as DSL and VoIP.
The story of leading without followers is also not simply about too much or too little
government intervention. The “controlled competition” regulatory regime did end up isolating
the market, but Japanese citizens benefited from their advanced domestic market, and were
willing to pay for advanced services. Moreover, without regulatory protections in the initial
phase of liberalization, NTTcould easily have engaged in predatory pricing to decimate all new
NCCs. Japan’s case also shows that tightly managed markets are not inherently detrimental to
rapid development. The broader lesson, however, is that strategy should focus not only on
fostering domestic competition, but also on shaping international linkages that help shape
technological trajectories. Catching up along existing technological trajectories is the primary
challenge for most late developers, but once caught up, the new challenge is not only how to
stay ahead, but how to stay ahead along the right trajectory. This requires a different type of
strategy–how to set trajectories–to avoid the real risk of becoming a leader without followers.
This is a potentially fruitful area for future research regarding China and other rapidly
developing economies, particularly those considered fast followers.
Finally, while this study reinforces the notion of global competition as national develop-
ments springing onto a global stage, it highlights a particular dilemma facing localities. If
domestic markets become too decoupled from global markets, then even if they become highly
developed, they cannot spring onto the global stage—the “Galapagos effect.” However, if the
domestic market is so open that it can only follow external trajectories, this weakens its
ability for distinctive competitive advantages to gestate in the domestic market before
bursting into global markets. The search for balance between distinctive advantages
through local resources versus becoming a permanent follower is a central challenge for
advanced industrial countries. Japan’s experience of becoming a leader without
followers is extreme, but it’s very extremity brings into sharp relief these issues facing
nations, regions, and industries worldwide. Future research can examine causes and
means to avoid a similar situation, along with the “Galapagos effect” in broad and
diverse regulatory and sectoral contexts.
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